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ABSTRACTS - 
The insertion of Latin-America in the 
lnternational Financial Market 
In the seventie's the externa1 fi- interest of the lendings is going to 
nantiation of Latin America coun- become one of the mainly factors 
tries suffered important changes in that will contribute to emphasize 
relation to the former years, not the externa1 unbalance of the region. 
only for the total amount of it but For this reason, the externa1 fi- 
also for the composition in the nancing that in a short-term cover 
source of externa1 lendings and for those deficits, in a middle-term and 
their finantial conditions. long-term is going to contribute in 
The incrising necesity of this it's increasing, so they will need to 
resources in the lastest years is come back to the same kind of 
mainly a consequence fundamental finantiation, thus reaching to a spi- 
of the externa1 unbalance situation ral increase of the debt, that will 
of the majority of Latin America clearly harm the economies of Latin 
countries, as a result of the own America countries. 
characteristics of their externa1 co- Our start will be then, to analize 
mercial relations, maily foreing in- the characteristics of the externa1 
vestment and international lendings. financiation in Latin America, and 
In fact, the current account ba- the changes that took place in the 
lance of Latin Arnerica, has suffered seventie's to go on then, with the 
an accelerated deterioration in the study of the debt problems in the 
middle seventie's, that it has been region and their effects in the eco- 
covered by means of externa1 fi- nomies of the region. 
nantiation, what it has permited Finally we will note the influence 
that reserves of the countries of of the international finantial capi- 
the region were kept at the same tal in the development of the re- 
level or even increased. But, as we gion specially of the International 
will see later on, the financial ser- Monetary Fund through their sta- 
vices specially the payment of the bilisation politics. 
Arms proliferation and arms 
control in Latin America 
Recent developments hace accen- hich recent developments in con- 
tuated the Latin America military ventional arms control and control 
build-up while undermining possi- of nuclear technology proliferation 
bilities for arms control. The con- will be reviewed. There have been 
tinuing trend toward arms proli- some important diferences in the 
feration will be noted first, after nature of the military build-up in_ 
the CaribbeanICentral America and 
South America, so that arms con- 
trol measures should be adapted 
accordingly to these two sub-regions 
of Latin America. During the period 
surveyed, conflicts continued to pla- 
gue both sub-regions, with the Cen- 
tral America conflicts being most 
prominent in the former and the 
Malvinas/Falklands conflict in the 
latter. Efforts to settle both of these 
disputes peacefully were notewor- 
thy, but in neither case, it will be 
noted, were attemts successful. The 
law-of-the-sea negotiations resulted 
in a treaty with important impli- 
cations for Latin America, but im- 
portant problems remain. 
European option in the spanish foreign policy 
At the beginning of the century, nated in 1979, in societal terms, but 
europeanisation was the same as governmentally it existed unti1 the 
saying modernisation in the socio- collapse of the centre. This phase 
political and economic orders, or is charactericed, €rom one s i d d y  
an overcoming of the irrationality the unanimity of the european op- 
of those years. During the Franco tion which all the political forces 
years, to be an europeanist was, agreed with, and on the other side 
generally, to attack the rules of the by the governmental action toward 
system without stepping out of it Europe considering the unic garan- 
and without risking being called thy for the system supervivence. 
an activist. Europeanism perfor- Three or four years ago, the 
nled in this phase a primordial poli- spanish public opinion and also the 
tical function, as an accord factor socio-political and economic forces 
betwen the democratic left and began to detect the troubles that 
r ight. could have a simple planning of an 
In the last dictatorial years, there obsesive europeanism in adition to 
arose a new concept of the word the problems that could produce to 
europeanism, which was perfecting spanish interests. 
of their attempts. This meaning The 28 of October government in 
uras basiclly an invention of the 1982 enphasized this general feeling 
Opus Dei technocrats to despoliti- an worked on european option in 
cize and <<des-ideologizen the term right terms and in a realistic way. 
as much as posible. So it has not exagerated the atlan- 
After Franco's death the word tism as the solution of our defensi- 
europeanization acquired a new ve interests, neither it has consi- 
nieaning and that is what I have dered the integration to the Comu- 
called {cacritic europeanismn. nity the solution of all our evils. 
Coming out of a dictatorial pe- Still exists in our country the 
riod always requires large doses o1 purpose of the european option 
characteristics of our democratic because is the only which would 
reconstruction is that we ourselves correspond and would give the 
have limit our enthusiasm because answer to our specific necesities. 
we thought that the situation was We know that the solutions for 
still very fragile. This phase culmi- Sgain pass through Europe but for 
this reason we don't have to think 
that Europe will resolve all our 
problems, really it will not resolve 
tre defensive ones, the economic 
ones nor the ones that come from 
a valeu crises. Also we have not 
to limit our posibilities of action 
over other areas. We must do an 
effort to confort the solutions for 
all the troubles, only from then on 
we will be able to see the real ad- 
vantages that Europe can give us. 
Spanish people really wants the 
consolidation of democracy, not 
just being satisfied for our perte- 
nence in the Comunities. Also we 
have to remember that the integra- 
tion in the Comunities could obs- 
The meaning 
On 6 June 1982 Israel formally 
launched its invasion of Lebanon. 
In fact, this war had already be- 
gun on 4-5 June with massive air 
raids on a number of Palestinian 
and Lebanese cities and settlements 
as well as on specifically military 
targts. While the systematic joint 
military operations of the Israeli 
army, navy and air forces were for- 
mally halted with the cease-fire of 
12 August, the reality is different. 
The Israeli army continues to be 
deployed in Lebanon and is current- 
ly engaged in different forms of 
warfare with the Palestinian and 
Lebanese resista~ce. But even if we 
were to accept that the war ended 
on 12-13 August 1982, this would 
still be Israel's longest war, and 
may yet turn out to be its costliest 
in moral, political and economic 
terms. 
At first this may seem paradoxi- 
cal. For it is quite clear that the 
adversaries in this war, Israel and 
truct our political proces because 
of the interests produced in this 
kind on socio-politic and economic 
relations. 
At the same time, we sould not 
considerer the Comunity the solu- 
tion for our economic problems. 
Spanish people ought to do severa1 
structural changes in the economy 
to get it right. Also, if the transi- 
tory meassures are not rightly ne- 
gociated, the Comunity can give us 
distorsions in a short and middle 
term, but in a long term the inser- 
tion must facilitate us, a task that 
it would be more difficult to do by 
ourselves. 
of Beirut, 1982 
its Palestinian and Lebanese na- 
tionalist opponents, were unequal 
in all respects. Israel is a society 
of close to four million people, with 
a national economy and tightly or- 
ganised structure; it could mobilise 
half a million men and women into 
its wars. (More than 100,000 soldiers 
were actively pressed into its in- 
vasion of Lebanon.) I t  has a vast 
and sophisticated air force, entireIy 
supplied by the United States, 
which is viewed by specialists as 
the strongest in the entire Middle 
East. And for the first time in the 
history of its attacks on the Arab 
States, Israel used its naval units, 
in complete coordination with its 
land and air forces, largely to shell 
civilian targets. 
Israel's war was principally aga- 
inst the Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganisation (PLO), and its consti- 
tuency in Lebanon, and the Leba- 
nese National Movement (LNM). 
White the basic society which un- 
iderlies the PLO can be identified 
with relative ease, that of the LNM 
is more problematic. The Palesti- 
nian community in Lebanon rarely 
~exceeded 450,000, the vast majority 
lof whom were those who were ex- 
pelled from Palestine in 1948 and 
their descendants. To these were 
,added a few thousand who moved 
to Lebanon after their expulsion 
Crom Jordan in 1970-7 1. But no com- 
-parable figures can be given of the 
:LNM1s basic constituency. For Le- 
banon has been subjected for many 
:years to processes of national frag- 
-mentation culminating in the ~ i v i l  
,war of 1975-76. The impact of this 
.fragmentation became evident in 
-the course of Israel's invasion of 
sf Lebanon. During the war, it was 
fairly simple to identify the three 
'broad categories of the Lebanese 
response: there were the national- 
ists affiliated with the LNM who 
Twere one of Israels' major targets; 
there were the accommodationists, 
clearly identified with the Lebanese 
government and state, who respon- 
ded fairly positively to Israel's pres- 
sure; and there were the quislings 
and collaborationists, typified by 
Major Saad Haddad with is Israeli 
supplied and controlled militias, 
and the Phalangists who actively 
assisted the Israeli war machine as 
it multilated Lebanon. While the 
strength of each grouping can be 
easily identified, how effectively 
each made use of its authority dif- 
j'ered considerably. The LNM had 
its basic strength in Beirut and the 
south. Fractious, lacking in effec- 
tive social, political and economic 
organisation and soinewhat diffuse, 
it was never able to mobilise as 
effectively as the Palestinian move- 
ment (or, indeed, their Phalangist 
opponents). The significance of this 
tliscrepancy became apparent dur- 
ing the mounting of the Palestinianl 
1,ebanese defence against Israel's 
jnvading army. No more than 50,000 
militants, modestly equipped (their 
most advanced weapon was the T34 
tank) and without an air force or 
cover against Israel's air power, 
could be mobilised. While Israel 
could, if need be, call upon its reser- 
ves, the Palestinian/Lebanese defen- 
ders had no reserves to draw upon. 
The political context of Israel's 
invasión was equally unfavourable 
to the Palestinian/Lebanese move- 
ments. Israel reaped the harvest of 
its peace settlement with Egypt, in 
making in incumbent upon the lat- 
ter to suppress all manifestations 
of public support for the Palesti- 
nians and Lebanese. Jordan had 
been immobilised for so long that 
its support too was effectively cur- 
tailed. Iraq was totally engaged in 
its conflict with Iran. Only Syria 
could have blunted Israel's sttacks; 
in had a adeterrent forcen in Leba- 
non numbering more than 30,000 
soldiers; its territory was occupied 
by Israel; it has been a long-time 
adversary of Zionism and Israel; 
and it was a pillar of the arejec- 
tiona front. But as soon as the in- 
vasion of Lebanon began, it became 
evident that neither Syria nor its 
~{deterrent forces would perform 
its historic role. A combination of 
reassuring signals from Israel and 
the US and Syria's own calculation 
of the costs of a confrontation in 
Lebanon produced the militant pos- 
ture of a rapidly disengaging army. 
Rational military and political 
colculations very early suggested 
that the battle would be almost 
over the moment it began. The ease 
with which Israel occupied and 
overran south of Lebanon sugges- 
ted that defending Beirut was an 
impossible task; it could only be 
a matter of days before the Is- 
raeli army would ovemhelm the 
city's PalestinianILebanese defen- 
ders. And although those days 
stretched ultimately to over two 
months, the leadership of the Joint 
Forces knew by the third week of 
June that the fall of Beirut was 
inevitable. That realisation produ- 
ced, on 23 June, the first Palesti- 
nian proposa1 for a permanents and 
secure cease-fire, disengagement 
and commitment to withdraw the 
forces of the PLO from Beirut. 
Israel -and the US- refused the 
Palestinian offer for a number of 
complex reason. Their refusa1 made 
it possible for the Palestinians/Le- 
banese to mount their successful 
defence of the city unti1 the condi- 
tions were once more ripe for Is- 
rael and the US to accept essen- 
tially a similar offer -two months 
later, and after enormous casual- 
ties and damage to the city. 
A decisive phase in the Palesti- 
nian-Zionist and in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict came to an end in the ten 
days between 21 August and 1 Sep- 
tember 1982. During those ten days, 
and in pursuance of the Agreement 
sponsored by Ambassador Philip 
Habib on behalf of the US, close 
to 15,000 Palestinian militants, lea- 
ders of the PLO and its functionai- 
res in Lebanon withdrew from the 
city and dispersed into prearranged 
locations in the Arab States. The 
new phase is yet to unfold, our 
conecrn now is to assess the events 
which culminated in the Palesti- 
nian exodus from Beirut, and the 
Israeli occupation of Lebanon. It 
may turn out to be as significant 
in shaping Palestinian and Arab 
history as the events of 1948. 
